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1. Introduction  
 
The relationship between government size and economic growth is not expected to be monotonic. 
On one hand, governments provide public goods and services and correct market failures. On the 
other hand, policy intervention generates its own distortions, as it requires taxes and distorts 
incentives. There is thus a tradeoff depending on the size-efficiency mix of the public sector. By 
efficiency, we mean the ability of the government to transform its revenues into public goods and 
services that benefit the economy and promote growth. After a critically large size, or a critically 
low efficiency, the costs of a larger public sector outweigh the benefits.
1 
This paper revisits the relation between fiscal size and economic growth. Our work differs 
from the empirical growth literature because this relation depends explicitly on the efficiency of the 
public sector. We use a sample of 64 countries, both developed and developing, in four 5-year 
periods over 1980-2000.  
To obtain a measure of government efficiency, we follow the methodology of Afonso, 
Schuknecht and Tanzi (2005) for the OECD and construct measures of public sector efficiency 
(PSE). This index measures the efficiency of public sector in reaching a range of objectives of 
government intervention. It is basically the ratio of performance indicators (output) to a measure of 
public expenditure related to those indicators (input), based on the assumption that the input is used 
to achieve that output. We construct such indexes of public sector efficiency for four policy areas: 
administration, stabilization, infrastructure and education. In addition to this measure, focusing on 
52 countries for the sub-period 1995-2000 during which more data are available, we also obtain an 
estimate of the so-called technical efficiency (TE) of the public sector by applying a stochastic 
production frontier analysis (see e.g. Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000, and Greene, 2005). The ranking 
of countries according to the TE measure does not differ substantially from that implied by the PSE 
measure.    
We then incorporate these two measures (PSE or TE) into a simple econometric model in 
which the size-growth relationship is non-monotonic depending on the size-efficiency mix. This 
novel feature is included into an otherwise standard growth regression (see e.g. Barro and Sala-i-
Martin, 2004, chapter 12). 
Our main finding is that, when the fiscal size is measured by the government consumption 
share in GDP, the size-efficiency mix is significant in explaining the size-growth relationship. The 
latter is indeed non-monotonic as discussed above. This result holds for both efficiency measures 
                                                            
1 A simple and popular conceptual framework is provided by Barro’s (1990) model, where there is a trade-off between 
growth-promoting public goods and the distorting taxes required to finance them. When the government size and its 
associated tax burden are high (resp. small) relative to the productivity of public sector, a larger size is bad (resp. good) 
for growth. See also Hillman (2003) and Mueller (2003) on the market failures vs policy distortions trade-off.     2
constructed and is robust to a number of changes in the econometric specification, as well as to 
dividing the world sample into two sub-samples consisting of “high-income” and “developing” 
countries. Among other things, the model provides an endogenously determined efficiency 
threshold below (resp. above) which the size-growth relationship is negative (resp. positive). In 
general, this relationship is found to be negative in most countries and time periods. When we use, 
for instance, the PSE as a measure of efficiency in our world sample for all four 5-year periods, our 
estimates imply that only in 34 out of 159 observations (different countries in different periods) the 
size-growth relationship is positive.
2  
Our results imply that what really matters to growth is not the government size per se, but 
the size-efficiency mix. They can also help to explain why the evidence on the growth effects of the 
overall fiscal size has so far been mixed (see e.g. Levine and Renelt, 1992, Tanzi and Zee, 1997, 
Gemmel and Kneller, 2001, and Mueller, 2003, chapter 22). Essentially, our results suggest that it is 
difficult to obtain a “robust” effect of the overall fiscal size on economic growth when important 
elements that shape the size-growth relationship (in our case, the efficiency of the public sector) are 
omitted from the analysis.
3 In sum, as Levine and Renelt (1992, p. 951) point out, “using simple 
expenditure data without accounting for government efficiency may yield inaccurate measures of 
the actual delivery of public services”. 
        The rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2 develops measures of government efficiency. 
Section 3 studies the growth effects of the size-efficiency mix. Conclusions are in Section 4.   
 
2. Measures of government efficiency  
 
In this section, we present two measures of government efficiency.  
 
2.1 Public sector efficiency 
Following Afonso et al. (2005, 2006), we construct sub-indices of relative Public Sector Efficiency 
(PSE) in certain policy areas in each country and each time period, and then take the average of 
these sub-indices to obtain an index of aggregate government efficiency in each country and each 
time period.  
                                                            
2 Regarding the causal effect of fiscal size on economic growth, a concern has been the potential endogeneity of fiscal 
size. The literature so far has not provided a “credible” identification of fiscal size in growth regressions (see e.g. Agell 
et al., 2006). Although the aim of our paper is not to resolve the causality issue, we also provide some evidence that it 
can be easier to find a credible identification of the size-efficiency mix, rather than of size alone, in growth regressions.  
3 An additional potential explanation that has received a lot of empirical support is that the overall size of government 
cannot capture the different implications of different government activities. As has been shown (see e.g. Devarajan et 
al., 1996, Kneller et al., 1999, and Angelopoulos et al., 2007), the growth effects of the different components of 
government expenditure, as well as of the various types of tax instruments, are not the same. See also Angelopoulos and 
Philippopoulos (2007) for a single country, time-series study that also supports the result that both the composition and 
efficiency of the government matter.    3
  Afonso et al. have constructed PSEs for seven policy areas for OECD countries over the 
eighties and nineties. Here, we focus on four policy areas (education, administration, infrastructure 
and stabilization) for 64 countries, both industrialized and developing, and four 5-year time-periods, 
over 1980-2000 (obviously, due to data availability, there is a trade-off between the number of 
countries and the number of policy areas).
4 We keep only those observations for which indexes of 
government efficiency in all four areas are available. 
  Since the methodology is in Afonso et al. (2005, 2006), here we only discuss the basic 
insight and point out where we differ. The basic insight of this methodology is to compare the 
performance of government in certain areas of economic activity (where these areas are influenced 
directly by government intervention) to the associated expenditure that the government allocates to 
achieve this particular performance. Thus, to construct a PSE index, we need a measure of Public 
Sector Performance (PSP) and a measure of the associated Public Sector Expenditure (PEX) for 
each country in each policy area and each time-period. Then, the PSE will be the ratio of PSP to 
PEX. More details about the construction of PSP and PSE indexes in each policy area are in our 
Appendix.  
  To make these PSP and PEX measures (expressed in different units of measurement) 
comparable across countries, we follow Afonso et al. by expressing each country’s PSP and PEX 
relative to the average PSP and PEX of all countries in each period, and this is done for all periods 
and indexes. In other words, each country’s PSP and PEX are expressed as percentages of the 
respective average (normalized to be 1), and in turn the PSE is obtained as the ratio of these relative 
PSP and PEX.
5 Therefore, the resulting PSE is an index that measures the efficiency of a country’s 
government relative to governments in other countries in each period in a particular policy area. The 
larger the value, the more efficient the country’s government is. This is the notion of relative 
efficiency in Afonso et al.  
  Table A.1 in the Appendix reports the relative PSPs, and the resulting PSEs, in the four 
policy areas for the countries and the time-periods that data are available. The order of countries is 
alphabetical. The second-from-the-end column in Table A.1 reports the (relative) aggregate 
efficiency of a country’s government obtained as the average of the four (relative) sub-indices. As 
expected, high-income OECD countries get on average better scores, although the public sectors in 
economies like Korea, Thailand or Malaysia appear to be particularly efficient. The most efficient 
governments during 1995-2000 are those of Korea (2.221), Canada (2.039), the USA (1.938) and 
                                                            
4 Greene (2005) has measured the efficiency of public spending in developing countries focusing on the areas of health 
and education. Afonso et al. (2006) have also constructed measures of public sector efficiency for a group of 24 upper-
middle income countries for the late nineties. 
5 Since the averages of PSP and PEX are both normalized to be 1, the resulting PSE has an average around 1 
(specifically, the PSEs in education and stabilization have an average of about 1.1, whereas the PSEs in infrastructure 
and administration have an average of about 1.25).       4
Switzerland (1.813) that are twice as efficient as the average countries, e.g. United Kingdom or 
France. At the bottom end, Namibia (0.483), Nicaragua (0.447) and Yemen (0.35) score about half 
of the average score.
6  
Of course, we have to be cautious with these estimates. For instance, in rich countries, like 
Finland or Sweden, the cost of resources used for providing public education or capital is higher 
than in say Uruguay or Lebanon, and this may result in an overestimation of relative efficiency in 
the latter group of countries. In addition, government performance in a certain policy area may be 
overestimated when private resources are used to complement government policy; this is especially 
the case of education in many countries (e.g. Greece).  
In sum, the main advantage of the above output-to-input approach is its simplicity and 
logical coherence, which allow a meaningful comparison across countries. Its main weakness is that 
several assumptions have to be made to calculate such a composite index (for a critical assessment 
of different methodologies and measures of public sector efficiency, see e.g. Afonso et al., 2005 and 
2006, as well as the special issue of European Economy, no. 3, 2004, on “Public finances in EMU 
2004”).  
 
 2.2 A stochastic production frontier methodology  
As an alternative approach to measuring government efficiency, we estimate a stochastic production 
frontier for the public sector and then obtain an estimate of the so-called Technical Efficiency 
(TE ) of this sector. For a review of this methodology, see Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000).  
Our stochastic frontier model is of the form: 
 
01 ln ln ii i i yx v u ββ =+ + −                                                                                        (1) 
 
where  i y  is a measure of public sector output in country i,  i x  is a measure of public sector input, 
i u  is the nonnegative technical inefficiency component of the error term, and  i v  is the noise 
component assumed to be distributed normally and independently of  i u . Both error components are 
assumed to be independent of the regressors. 
                                                            
6 Two countries score suspiciously high in this Table. Paraguay, which seems to be the most efficient country in the 
world, and Argentina, which seems to be the second most efficient country in the last time-period. Regarding Paraguay, 
this result is driven by a very high score in the variable Electric Power Transmission and Distribution Losses (see the 
Appendix), which results in a very high PSP in infrastructure. This score may reflect measurement errors or unusual 
circumstances, so we drop Paraguay from our regressions in the next section. Regarding Argentina, the high efficiency 
score for 1995-2000 is probably due to the extended stabilization program implemented by the country in this period. 
We also choose not to include Argentina in our analysis in the next section. We report, however, that including these 
two countries does not have a significant effect on the econometric results presented later.    5
After estimating equation (1) by maximum likelihood, a measure of technical efficiency for 
each country i  ( i TE ) is defined as: 
 
[] exp{ }/ ii i TE E u ε =−                                                                                              (2) 
    
where  iii vu ε =− (see Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000, chapter 3, for details). This efficiency score is 
bounded between zero and one.   
  To apply the above, we need to measure public sector outputs and inputs ( i y  and  i x , 
respectively). We use the average of the PSP indices as a measure of  i y . As a measure of  i x , we 
use  Total Government Expenditure (as a share of GDP) which is available from the World 
Development Indicators. We estimate (1)-(2) under the assumption that  i u  is characterized by a 
nonnegative half-normal distribution (we have also examined the case where  i u  is assumed to 
follow a truncated normal distribution but, since this gives very similar results, we discuss only the 
nonnegative half-normal case).  
Results for each country’s technical government efficiency ( i TE ) during the 1995-2000 
sub-period (where we again look at a 5-year period average, as we did with the PSE measure above) 
are reported in Table A.2.
7 The ranking results look sensible again. In this cross-section world 
sample during 1995-2000, Switzerland’s government scores the best being followed by Sweden and 
Finland. Again, as probably expected, governments in OECD countries are more efficient than 
those in developing countries, although public sectors in fast-growing economies like Thailand, 
Malaysia, Cyprus and especially Korea get high scores. Algeria, Nicaragua and Yemen have now 
the least efficient governments. Therefore, the ranking of countries using the PSE measure does not 
differ substantially from that using the TE measure (recall that this refers to the 1995-2000 period 
during which both measures are available) with the correlation coefficient being 0.75.  
In this sample, an LR test of the null that  0
2 = u σ  gives a value of 5.64, which rejects the 
null (the respective p-value of the test is 0.009).
8 This implies that government technical efficiency 
differs significantly across countries during 1995-2000. We report that we have also estimated 
government TE during the three time-periods before 1995 (i.e. the three 5-year periods between 
1980 and 1995). However, there are significantly less data available for these earlier years 
                                                            
7 To examine whether the  i TE  estimates in Table A.2 are not biased due to heteroskedasticity in either  i v  or  i u  (see 
Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000), we have tested whether the variance functions of  i v  or  i u  depend (linearly) on govexp. 
Since this is rejected, we can have some faith in the homoskedasticity assumption.  
8 The limiting distribution of the LR test statistic is a mixture of a chi-square with zero degrees of freedom, i.e. a point 
mass at zero, and a chi-square with 1 degree of freedom (see e.g. Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000). The p-value of the test 
reported here takes this into account.   6
(especially in the eighties when the sample size drops to around 25-30, i.e. it mainly consists of the 
OECD countries). Not surprisingly, we have not been able to reject the null  0
2 = u σ  for any of these 
early periods. Hence, concerning the TE  measure, we concentrate on the 1995-2000 period.   
In sum, the TE  measure has obvious advantages but, on the other hand, it depends on the 
assumptions made about the error term. The assumption that government expenditure is 
uncorrelated with the error term may be strong when governments respond to negative shocks by 
increasing their expenditures. In any case, the TE  measure of government efficiency provides a 
useful alternative measure also used below to check the importance of the size-efficiency mix. 
 
3. The size-efficiency nexus matters to growth 
 
This section tests whether there is a non-monotonic relationship between government size and 
economic growth with this relationship driven by the size-efficiency mix.     
  
3.1 Econometric model  
We use the above constructed measures of government efficiency (PSE  or TE) in a growth 
regression of the following form (see Dutt and Mitra, 2002, for a similar specification in a trade 
policy context):   
 
it it it it it it X eff size size growth ε β α α α + + + + = * 2 1 0                                                        (3) 
 
where  it growth  is the growth rate of country i at time t,  it size  is a measure of government size, 
it eff  is a measure of government efficiency (PSE  or TE) and  it X  includes control variables usually 
included in growth regressions (see below).  







2 1 α α + =
∂
∂
                                                                                                    (4) 
 
where we expect  2 α  to be positive in the sense that the more efficient the public sector, the larger 
the positive effect of government on growth. We also expect  1 α  to be negative to catch the adverse 
effects of government size on growth.  
As long as the estimated coefficients  1 α  and  2 α  in (3) are statistically significant and have  
the right signs, so that the size-efficiency nexus matters to growth, the above specification can also   7
give an estimate of a (common to all countries) critical level of efficiency, 
* eff , where 
0 ) / ( 2 1
* > − ≡ α α eff  makes the partial in (4) equal to zero. When an individual country’s 
efficiency,  it eff , is higher (resp. lower) than 
* eff , the positive (resp. negative) effects dominate and 
the country is placed on the positively (resp. negatively) sloped part of the size-growth curve; this,  
of course, requires 
* eff  to lie within the range of values of  it eff  in the data. Note that (3)-(4) imply 
that the growth effects of fiscal size can differ among countries and time-periods.
9  
 
3.2 Data and variables used in the regressions     
For the eff variable, we use the two measures of government efficiency (TE and PSE) constructed in 
section 2 above. The rest of the variables are as in most of the literature. We work with 5-year 
period averages as we did with our eff measures (5-year periods are also used in the growth 
literature, especially the literature on the growth effects of fiscal policy, see e.g. Folster and 
Henrekson, 2001, and Kneller et al, 1999). The main datasets used are the Penn World Tables 
(PWT) version 6.1 (see Heston et al., 2002) and the World Development Indicators (WDI) 
developed by the World Bank.  
Our dependent variable, the growth rate of per capita GDP, is from the PWT. In particular, 
the PWT dataset provides us with the real GDP per capita in constant prices, which is then used to 
obtain the five-year average of annual growth rates (denoted as growth in our regressions). The 
PWT also provides us with consumption of the general government as a share of GDP in constant 
prices, which is averaged over 5-year periods to give a variable denoted as govshare in our 
regressions. This will be our primary measure of government size.
10 An alternative measure of 
government size, which is also used below, is total expenditures of the central government as a 
share of GDP (denoted as govexp  in our regressions and obtained from WDI). This variable 
includes transfers and interest payments on public debt, in addition to government consumption 
(note that to avoid double counting, we do not include government investment in our govexp 
measure, as government investment is included in the investment share in GDP used as a separate 
regressor (see below).  
                                                            
9 We have also examined a specification like it it it it it X size size growth ε β α α α + + + + =
2
12 11 0 , which gives a partial as 
a function of size, so that an “optimal” size can be calculated given the estimated coefficients irrespectively of 
efficiency. We report that estimation of this equation does not give meaningful results (coefficients are not significant 
and in some regressions they have wrong signs).  
10 This is the general government consumption component of GDP. It does not include public investment, interest 
payments, subsidies and other transfers. Public investment is included in PWT in the variable “investment share in 
GDP” (see below). Note however that a large part of government spending on goods and services, included in govshare, 
has investment features (e.g. salaries of teachers, professors and doctors and spending on police or the judiciary 
system). The variable govshare is closer to what Tanzi and Schuknecht (2000) refer to as a measure of “real 
government expenditure”.    8
Concerning the above two measures of fiscal size, an advantage of govshare over govexp is 
that it refers to the general government and can thus capture better the full trust of fiscal size on 
economic growth; moreover, it is PPP adjusted and therefore more suitable for international 
comparisons. The advantage of govexp, on the other hand, is that it allows us to examine whether 
including more types of government expenditure (at the disadvantage of using data at the central 
level only) gives different results regarding the effect of fiscal size on growth. Ideally, we would 
like to have a measure of general government spending for all types of government expenditure, but 
unfortunately, such a measure does not, as far as we know, exist for all the countries and time 
periods in our world sample. Finally, the fiscal size of government can be also measured by tax 
revenue or the budget balance, both as shares of GDP (see e.g. Tanzi and Zee, 1997, and Persson 
and Tabellini, 2003); see below in subsection 3.4 for details.
11 
In our choice of the control variables included in  X  in equation (3) above, we will follow 
most of the literature (see e.g. Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2004, chapter 12, and the review papers 
mentioned above). Thus, we use the logarithm of the initial level of GDP per capita (denoted as 
lgdp), obtained from PWT, to control for convergence effects; the initial (or the value closest to the 
beginning of the period) secondary school enrolment rate (denoted as enrol), obtained from WDI, to 
proxy for human capital;
12 the investment share of GDP (denoted as investment), obtained from 
PWT and averaged over the 5-year period; the logarithm of the fertility ratio (denoted as fertility), 
obtained from WDI; a measure of openness (denoted as openness), obtained from PWT and defined 
as the sum of exports and imports over GDP.
13 Finally, we include in our regressions time 
dummies, as well as regional dummies for countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, East Asia, Latin 
America and the economies in transition.  
 
3.3 Basic results     
Results using the PSE measure of efficiency for the sample of 64 countries over 1980-2000 are 
presented in Table 1. We report standard errors obtained under the assumption of spherical errors 
and standard errors that are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity and arbitrary intra-country serial 
                                                            
11 The tax revenue-to-GDP ratio is generally not preferred to fiscal spending measures, mainly because of tax evasion 
problems (see e.g. Tanzi and Zee, 1997). The same can be said about the budget-to-GDP ratio since it includes tax 
revenue.   
12 A better proxy for human capital could be a measure of the average years of schooling (see e.g. Barro and Sala-i-
Martin, 2004). However, such measures are not available for all the countries in our sample and we do not want to 
restrict our sample for any other reasons than the requirements for the efficiency measure. Hence, we use the enrol 
variable, also used by Levine and Renelt (1992).  
13 We have also used the average annual growth rate of the labour force, obtained from the WDI, in the growth 
regressions, but it is always insignificant.    9
correlation (see e.g. Wooldridge, 2002). The first three columns report estimates when using 
govshare as a measure of fiscal size and the last three when using govexp.
14  
 
Table 1 around here 
 
In column 1 of Table 1, we start with a standard growth regression: the coefficient of 
govshare is significantly negative. In column 2, we add the PSE measure of government efficiency, 
which is positive but marginally significant, while the coefficient of govshare remains significantly 
negative. To examine whether it is government efficiency that shapes the size-growth relationship, 
we move to column 3, which presents results for our key equation (3) above.
15 Both estimates of 
govshare and govshare*eff are significant with the expected sign (negative and positive 
respectively), indicating a heterogeneous across countries size-growth relationship depending on 
government efficiency. Actually, the estimates imply a threshold of  358 . 1
* = eff , which means that 
only in 34 out of 159 observations (different countries in different time periods), the size-growth 
relationship is positive. 
The estimated coefficients  1 α  and  2 α  also allow us to calculate the growth effect of fiscal 
size in each country and each time period, as implied by equation (4). Results are reported in the 
last column of Table A.1. As can be seen, the estimated effect differs substantially across countries. 
There is a small group of countries where public sectors are efficient meaning a positive growth 
effect from fiscal size. This group includes Canada, Japan, Korea and Switzerland in all time 
periods we have data for; and Australia, Finland and the USA in most time periods (here we report 
those countries with more than one observation/time period; see Table A.1 for all countries). 
However, for most countries and time periods, this effect is negative. Therefore, the general picture 
that emerges is that fiscal sizes have grown too much - relative to public sector efficiency - in the 
last decades. This finding is similar to the arguments made in e.g. Gwartney et al. (1998) and Tanzi 
and Schuknecht (2000) although these papers do not take account of efficiency explicitly.  
Regarding the control variables that enter significantly, lgdp is negative, implying 
(conditional) convergence, while investment and openness are positive. The effect of fertility is 
negative (this is as in Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2004, chapter 12) but not robustly significant. The 
effect of enrolment is positive but not significant. Regarding the regional dummies, those for the 
economies in transition are significantly negative, while those for Latin American countries are 
                                                            
14 We do not include a dummy for each country (and thus we do not estimate fixed effects regressions) as this would 
result in losing all cross-country variation. This is important because the measure of efficiency developed here is a 
relative one across countries. It would make little sense to use this variation to explain differences within countries only.     10
negative but not significant when we use robust standard errors. An interesting result is the negative 
dummy for East Asian countries, as this variable usually has a positive effect in similar regressions 
(see e.g. Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2004, chapter 12). However, East Asian countries, in general, are 
ranked highly in our efficiency measures (see Table A.1), so that a large part of the positive 
regional effect has been already controlled for by our fiscal measure.  
The results are less clear when we use the other widely used measure of fiscal size, govexp 
(see the last three columns in Table 1). The coefficient of govexp is negative but not robustly so (see 
column 5 that includes pse). More importantly, in column 6, there is no significant evidence of a 
non-linear relationship like the one found in column 3; namely, the coefficient of govexp*pse is not 
significant (although it has the right sign). Recall that the key difference between govshare and 
govexp is that the latter includes redistributive transfers and interest payments on public debt. Both 
items (i.e. transfers and interest payments) do not involve a direct use of real resources by the state 
sector (recall the economy’s resource constraint). We thus do not find it surprising that govexp does 
not give as clear results as govshare. In a sense, these new results indicate that both the size-
efficiency mix and the composition of government expenditure matter to growth.
16 
 
3.4 Robustness of basic results  
We now examine the robustness of the basic results above by extending the empirical specification 
in two dimensions. First, we test whether our results - regarding the importance of the size-
efficiency mix on growth - are sensitive to the financing assumption of government spending (see 
e.g. Miller and Russek, 1997, and Kneller et al., 1999). Given that we do not have detailed tax and 
spending data for all the countries and time periods in our sample, we use a general form of 
government budget that equates aggregate spending to tax revenue and deficit (see e.g. Miller and 
Russek, 1997). In principle, in the absence of Ricardian equivalence, the effect of spending on 
growth can be different depending on whether higher spending is financed by more tax revenues or 
by a larger budget deficit (higher debt). If, for instance, we include a measure of taxation, together 
with spending, in a growth regression, we would expect the effect of the tax measure to be negative 
                                                                                                                                                                                                     
15 We do not include eff together with  eff size*  in the same regression, as they are highly correlated and as a result both 
eff and  eff size*  become insignificant. In this specification, the growth effect of government efficiency takes place only 
via government size, assuming that efficiency is independent of size.   
16 We have also used another potential measure of the extent of government involvement in the economy, the so-called 
Economic Freedom index as developed by the Fraser Institute (see e.g. Gwartney et al., 2006). The Economic Freedom 
(EF) index is a rather general measure of government involvement than includes the size of government; the degree of 
regulation of credit, labor and business by the government; the legal structure; the security of property rights; the 
freedom to trade; etc. We report that, when we use the EF index as a measure of fiscal size in our regressions for the 
world sample (i.e. instead of govshare and govexp), then (a) it has a negative growth effect (see also De Haan et al., 
2006) although this effect is not always significant (b) the estimated  2 α  is not significant in equations (3)-(4) above. 
We believe this is not surprising given that this index contains more variables than the size of the government, while 
equations like (3) test whether the growth effect of size depends on the size-efficiency mix.  Besides, the EF index may 
be correlated with government efficiency.    11
capturing the adverse implications of a larger fiscal size, whereas the effect of the spending measure 
to be positive capturing the positive effects of e.g. more public good provision. It is therefore 
interesting to see whether our results are robust to the inclusion of a finance instrument (obviously, 
because of multi-collinearity problems, we cannot include both tax revenues and public deficits in 
the regressions).     
For our sample, we obtain data for tax revenues, as a share of GDP, from the WDI database 
(we denote the respective measure, which is again expressed in 5-year period averages, as tax). We 
then rerun the basic regressions of Table 1 by including tax as an additional explanatory variable. 
Results for the main variables are shown in Table 2 (since the estimates for the control variables are 
not generally affected, we do not include them in Table 2 to save on space - these results are 
available upon request). As can be seen, the results of Table 1 remain essentially unchanged when 
we include tax, which, itself, is not significant. We report that these results again do not change if 
we use deficits instead of taxes.
17  
 
Tables 2 and 3 around here 
 
Second, we also test whether the inclusion of lagged growth rates changes our results. 
Although our basic specification (see Table 1) is common in the empirical growth-policy literature 
working with 5-year averages (see e.g. Kneller et al., 1999, and Folster and Henrekson, 2001), 
dynamic effects from past growth may persist even after five years. Therefore, we now examine 
whether the size-efficiency mix retains its significance in explaining economic growth, even after 
controlling for lagged growth rates (see also Miller and Russek, 1997). Results obtained from 
including the lagged-once growth rate (denoted as grolag in our regressions) as an explanatory 
variable in the regressions of Table 1 are reported in Table 3 (again, we present results for the main 
variables only to save on space). Note that the sample size drops from 159 to 98 observations (there 
are now 46 instead of 62 countries). The lagged-once growth rate is generally significant, but the 
results for the main variables of interest are not qualitatively affected. Actually, in column (3), 
where we present our key results by using govshare, grolag is not found to be significant.   
                                                            
17 Notice, when we compare Tables 1 and 2, that the inclusion of tax does not alter the negative effects of govshare and 
govexp in columns (1) and (4) respectively. Thus, the effect of government size itself, as measured by govshare or 
govexp, remains negative even if we add a measure of the tax burden, tax. This is probably because tax revenues, as an 
ex post measure, is not an ideal proxy for the distortions imposed by the tax system; higher tax revenue may e.g. reflect 
less tax evasion and better institutions (see Tanzi and Zee, 1997 and Angelopoulos et al., 2007, for discussion and 
references). Thus, the basic size-efficiency specification in Table 1 appears to be good enough to capture the trade-offs 
in fiscal policy at least in our sample. In other words, to the extent that we  allow the effect of the fiscal size to depend 
on the size-efficiency mix, we view our basic specification as an alternative to including both spending (see positive 
effects) and taxation (see negative effects) to capture the trade-off in fiscal policy.     12
Finally, in Table 4, we present results for the main variables by including both grolag and 
tax in our regressions. As can be seen, the previous results and analysis remain robust to this 
specification as well. 
 
Table 4 around here 
  
3.5 High-income and developing countries 
So far - although we allowed for the effect of fiscal size to differ across countries depending on the 
efficiency of the public sector in each country - we have studied rich and developing countries 
jointly in a single sample. We now divide countries into two subgroups to study whether the size-
efficiency mix matters differently in high income and developing countries (where we classify 
countries as high income following the classification in the WDI dataset). For each group, we first 
calculate the measure of public sector efficiency (PSE) separately, repeating the steps described in 
sub-section 2.1 above (since the efficiency measure is re-constructed for more homogeneous groups 
of countries, this can provide an additional robustness test).  
 
Tables 5 and 6 around here 
 
Using these new PSE measures, Tables 5 and 6 rerun the basic regressions of Table 1 for 
high income and developing countries respectively (again, we present results for the main variables 
only to save on space). As can be seen, the results remain practically unchanged for the subgroup of 
high-income countries in Table 5. For the subgroup of developing countries in Table 6, the main 
story, regarding the importance of the size-efficiency mix, is again supported when we use govshare 
as a measure of fiscal size (see column (3) in Table 6), which is as in the world sample above. It is 
interesting to note that, for developing countries, public expenditure is not significantly related to 
economic growth in the first two columns, but significance is restored in column (3) that explicitly 
allows for the size-efficiency mix. All this suggests that in both subgroups, our story - that the size-
efficiency mix matters - is confirmed by the data.  
We finally report that these results are robust to the inclusion of tax as an explanatory 
variable (see subsection 3.4 above). On the other hand, including grolag reduces the sample size in 
both subgroups too much to give any reliable results.    
 
3.6 Can the size-efficiency mix help with  endogeneity?   
When looking for a causal effect from fiscal policy in a growth regression, a usual concern is that 
there might be a reverse causality when e.g. governments respond to negative shocks by increasing   13
their expenditure (see e.g. Tanzi and Zee, 1997, and Agell et al., 2006). Although this problem is to 
some extent mitigated here since we work with 5-year averages, such reverse causality cannot be 
excluded. In addition, our fiscal size variables, and especially the measure of government 
efficiency, may be correlated with the error term due to omitted variables or measurement error.  
The natural approach to dealing with such an endogeneity is to use instruments for the 
endogenous variables in IV methods. A fundamental concern with IV regression methods, however, 
is whether the instruments are valid and relevant. As far as we know, the relevant literature has not 
yet provided a credible identification of fiscal policy so that the instruments used are both 
exogenous and strongly correlated with the endogenous variables (see e.g. Agell et al., 2006). We 
now investigate whether accounting for the size-efficiency mix can help in this direction. We will 
build upon the basic specification of subsection 3.3.  
We need instruments for size and size*eff in 2SLS regressions. As such instruments, we use 
variables usually considered as potential determinants of fiscal policy (see e.g. Person and Tabellini, 
2003, chapter 3). In particular, we use the age dependency ratio (agedep) and two measures of 
country size (population and surface, denoted respectively as pop and surface). All these three 
variables are obtained from WDI and, except for surface, are averaged over the 5-year periods. In 
Table 2, we present results for the core variables when we re-estimate the basic regressions of Table 
1 by using these instruments in 2SLS methods (the results for the control variables do not change 
significantly, so we do not present them to save on space). 
 
Table 7 around here 
 
We start again with the govshare variable. When we do not account for efficiency (column 1 
in Table 7), the Sargan over-identifying restrictions test rejects the null that the instruments are 
uncorrelated with the error term. However, when efficiency is included as an endogenous variable, 
either on its own (column 2) or multiplicatively with govshare (column 3), the null clearly cannot 
be rejected (the p-value is very low in both cases). Therefore, in this sample, the instruments affect 
growth only indirectly through the size-efficiency mix. Note also that the Anderson (1984) 
canonical correlations, and the Cragg and Donald (1993) tests of whether the equation is under-
identified, reject the null thus lending some support to the relevance of the instruments.
18 More 
importantly, the first-stage F-statistic is very high for the govshare*eff variable, which indicates that 
the instruments are strongly correlated with this variable. Although the first-stage F-statistic for 
govshare is not as high, it is clear that the diagnostics favor the key regression in column 3 that 
controls for the size-efficiency mix. In this regression (in column 3), the critical  238 . 1
* = eff  
                                                            
18 These tests have been implemented using the routines written by Baum et al. (2006).   14
implies that in 46 countries/periods there is a positive effect on growth from govshare. The fact that 
the critical efficiency level is lower in the 2SLS regressions indicates that the estimate of fiscal size 
is biased downwards when endogeneity is not accounted for, so that the “true” effect of fiscal size 
may in fact be less negative (or more positive) than implied in Table 1 for many countries. 
As in Table 1 above, the results are not so promising when we use the govexp variable as a 
measure of government size. Although the Sargan test does not reject the validity of the 
instruments, the Anderson (1984) canonical correlations and the Cragg and Donald (1993) tests 
cannot reject the null that the equation in column 6 of Table 7 is under-identified.  
Therefore, although further research is clearly required concerning the issue of causality in 
the fiscal policy-growth relation in cross-country growth regressions, our results suggest that taking 
account of the size-efficiency mix can help in identifying the growth effects of fiscal policy.  
  
3.7 An alternative measure of government efficiency  
To further examine the robustness of our results, we also use the TE measure of efficiency 
instead of PSE. Again, we will build upon the basic specification of subsection 3.3.  
As explained in section 2, we have been able to obtain the TE measure for the 1995-2000 
period only. In Table 8, we present results focusing on this period. Actually, in this table, we report 
results for both the PSE and TE indices of government efficiency, and both the govshare and 
govexp measures of fiscal size. This has the additional advantage of checking whether there has 
been a structural break in the size-efficiency-growth relationship of equation (3). The regressions in 
Table 8 are the same as those in Table 1, except that now we do not include time dummies.  
 
Table 8 around here 
 
  We start again with govshare (columns 1-3). The average effect of govshare is negative 
(column 1), while the size efficiency mix (when we use the PSE measure for efficiency) is 
important (column 2). Thus, the non-monotonic relationship holds for both the whole period and the 
1995-2000 sub-period. The critical level of efficiency is now  216 . 1
* = eff , which implies that for 
24 out of 51 countries in this period the size-growth relationship is positive. Note also that the 
regression with the size-efficiency mix is much better that the regression without it, as can be seen 
by both the increase in 
2 R  and the fact that the coefficients of lgdp, openness and East Asia become 
significant. Regarding lgdp, in particular, this implies that the size-efficiency mix is an important 
long-run determinant of economic growth that has to be conditioned upon so that convergence can 
be captured in the data (see e.g. Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2004, chapter 12, for conditional 
convergence).   15
   Then, we estimate equation (3) for the 1995-2000 sample by using TE as the efficiency 
measure. Results are in column (3). The coefficients are again significant with the right signs. The 
critical efficiency is now  889 . 0
* = eff , which implies that only in 8 out of 51 countries in this 
period the size-growth relationship is positive (see the last column in Table A.2 for the estimated 
growth effect in each country in this case). These are Finland, Korea, Sweden and Switzerland, as 
well as (but only marginally) Canada, Germany, Iceland and Uruguay. Note, however, that the 
regression with the PSE measure in the size-efficiency mix explains about 10% more of the 
variation in the growth rate than the regression with the TE measure. 
  In columns 4-6 of Table 8, we repeat the same regressions by using govexp as a measure of 
government size. As before, govexp is negative and significant, while the size*eff variables have a 
positive sign but are not significant.  
  As we did in Table 7, we have also run 2SLS regressions for the equations in Table 8 by 
using the same set of instruments for the size-efficiency mix. The estimated coefficients are again 
supportive of the importance of the size-efficiency nexus, at least for the govshare measure, but the 
first stage regression diagnostics reveal that the instruments are not strongly correlated with the 
endogenous variables. Since the small sample size does not help us to draw any safe conclusions, 
we find the results of Table 7 to be more reliable. In any case, as discussed above, the identification 
of fiscal policy remains a challenge in this literature. Finally, we report that with the TE measure of 
efficiency, we cannot divide countries into rich and developing, as we did in subsection 3.5 (the 
sub-samples are now too small). Concerning the addition of tax in the regressions (as we did in 
subsection 3.4 above), we report that once more the main results are not affected. 
  Therefore, the main result from this subsection is that the relationship between the size-
efficiency mix and economic growth is robust to the time period and the measure of government 
efficiency used.  
 
4. Concluding remarks   
 
We revisited the relationship between fiscal size and economic growth and provided evidence that 
this relationship depends on the size-efficiency mix of the public sector. The policy implication is 
that what matters to growth is not the size per se, but the size-efficiency mix. Of course, improving 
the efficiency of the public sector is not an easy task. It requires, among other things, the 
reallocation of government resources, as well as the effective and efficient use of those resources 
towards identified and transparent strategic priorities. 
  The measurement of government efficiency is still an open issue. The measures developed 
here, although plausible, cannot be treated as definitive. Future research may provide alternative   16
measures to test the robustness of our results. Further research is also needed to investigate the 
causal effects of fiscal policy on growth in cross-country regressions. We nevertheless believe that 
we have contributed to these important policy issues.     
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- - - 
govshare*pse  - -  0.078   
[0.030]** 
(0.039)** 
- - - 









govexp*pse  - -  -  -  -  0.009 
[0.028] 
(0.027) 
Pse  - 0.919 
[0.477]* 
(0.567) 






























































































































































































2 R   0.378 0.394  0.405  0.374 0.377 0.375 
Notes: 1. The estimation method is Least Squares. The sample consists of 62 countries, in 5-year periods over 
1980-2000. There is a total of 159 observations. All regressions include time dummies. 2. Standard errors obtained 
under the assumption of spherical errors are shown in brackets below the estimated coefficients. Standard errors that 
are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity and arbitrary intra-country serial correlation are shown in parentheses. 3. An 
asterisk denotes significance at the 10% level and two asterisks at the 5% level.  
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- - - 
govshare*pse  - -  0.072   
[0.035]** 
(0.048) 
- - - 









govexp*pse  - -  -  -  -  0.016 
[0.029] 
(0.032) 
pse  - 0.748 
[0.594] 
(0.699) 






















2 R   0.388 0.395  0.405  0.376 0.381 0.377 
Notes: 1. The estimation method is Least Squares. The sample consists of 62 countries, in 5-year periods over 
1980-2000. There is a total of 159 observations. All regressions include time dummies, regional dummies and the 
control variables of the regressions in Table 1. 2. Standard errors obtained under the assumption of spherical errors 
are shown in brackets below the estimated coefficients. Standard errors that are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity 
and arbitrary intra-country serial correlation are shown in parentheses. 3. An asterisk denotes significance at the 10% 
level and two asterisks at the 5% level.  
 
























- - - 
govshare*pse  - -  0.103   
[0.0474]** 
(0.057) 
- - - 









govexp*pse  - -  -  -  -  0.001 
[0.034] 
(0.039) 
pse  - 1.120 
[0.679] 
(0.674) 






















2 R   0.458 0.475  0.487  0.448 0.448 0.448 
Notes: 1. The estimation method is Least Squares. The sample consists of 46 countries, in 5-year periods over 
1985-2000. There is a total of 98 observations. All regressions time dummies, regional dummies and the control 
variables of the regressions in Table 1. 2. Standard errors obtained under the assumption of spherical errors are shown 
in brackets below the estimated coefficients. Standard errors that are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity and 
arbitrary intra-country serial correlation are shown in parentheses. 3. An asterisk denotes significance at the 10% level 
and two asterisks at the 5% level.    19

























- - - 
govshare*pse  - -  0.140   
[0.057]** 
(0.077)* 
- - - 









govexp*pse  - -  -  -  -  0.054 
[0.034] 
(0.049 
pse  - 1.585 
[0.868] 
(1.026) 








































2 R   0.458 0.479  0.495  0.485 0.501 0.497 
Notes: 1. The estimation method is Least Squares. The sample consists of 46 countries, in 5-year periods over 
1985-2000. There is a total of 98 observations. All regressions include time dummies, regional dummies and the control 
variables of the regressions in Table 1. 2. Standard errors obtained under the assumption of spherical errors are shown 
in brackets below the estimated coefficients. Standard errors that are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity and 
arbitrary intra-country serial correlation are shown in parentheses. 3. An asterisk denotes significance at the 10% level 
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- - - 
govshare*pse  - -  0.124   
[0.038]** 
(0.040)** 
- - - 









govexp*pse  - -  -  -  -  0.004 
[0.023] 
(0.019) 
pse  - 1.161 
[0.358]** 
(0.345)** 




2 R   0.599 0.649  0.649  0.673 0.674 0.674 
Notes: 1. The estimation method is Least Squares. The sample consists of 26 countries, in 5-year periods over 
1980-2000. There is a total of 85 observations. All regressions include time dummies and the control variables of the 
regressions in Table 1. 2. Standard errors obtained under the assumption of spherical errors are shown in brackets 
below the estimated coefficients. Standard errors that are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity and arbitrary intra-
country serial correlation are shown in parentheses. 3. An asterisk denotes significance at the 10% level and two 





























- - - 
govshare*pse  - -  0.078   
[0.037]** 
(0.044)* 
- - - 









govexp*pse  - -  -  -  -  0.090 
[0.050]* 
(0.057) 
pse  - 1.127 
[0.848] 
(1.131) 




2 R   0.191 0.213  0.243  0.192 0.212 0.238 
Notes: 1. The estimation method is Least Squares. The sample consists of 36 countries, in 5-year periods over 
1980-2000. There is a total of 74 observations. All regressions include time dummies and the control variables of the 
regressions in Table 1. 2. Standard errors obtained under the assumption of spherical errors are shown in brackets 
below the estimated coefficients. Standard errors that are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity and arbitrary intra-
country serial correlation are shown in parentheses. 3. An asterisk denotes significance at the 10% level and two 
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- - - 
govshare*pse  - -  0.168   
[0.053]** 
(0.054)** 
- - - 









govexp*pse  - - -  -  -  0.314 
[0.198] 
(0.205) 
pse  - 4.826   
[1.902]** 
(1.775)** 







(2) χ = 9.513 
(0.008) 
2
) 1 ( χ = 0.110 
(0.739) 
2
) 1 ( χ = 0.029 
(0.865) 
2
(2) χ = 9.894 
(0.007) 
2
) 1 ( χ = 4.144 
(0.041) 
2






) 3 ( χ = 20.78 
(0.000) 
2
) 2 ( χ = 15.12 
(0.000) 
2
) 2 ( χ = 19.88 
(0.000) 
2
) 3 ( χ = 42.17 
(0.000) 
2
) 2 ( χ = 8.96 
(0.011) 
2





) 3 ( χ = 19.53 
(0.000) 
2
) 2 ( χ = 14.44 
(0.000) 
2
) 2 ( χ = 18.73 
(0.000) 
2
) 3 ( χ = 37.40 
(0.000) 
2
) 2 ( χ = 8.72 
(0.012) 
2




) 143 , 3 ( F = 
6.23 
) 143 , 3 ( F = 
6.23 
) 143 , 3 ( F = 
6.23 
) 143 , 3 ( F = 
12.64 
) 143 , 3 ( F = 
12.64 




-  ) 143 , 3 ( F = 
4.91 





- -  ) 143 , 3 ( F = 
11.95 
- -  ) 143 , 3 ( F = 
3.59 
Notes: Notes: 1. The estimation method is 2SLS. The sample consists of 62 countries, in 5-year periods over 1980-
2000. There is a total of 159 observations. All regressions include time dummies, regional dummies and the control 
variables of the regressions in Table 1. 2. Standard errors obtained under the assumption of spherical errors are shown 
in brackets below the estimated coefficients. Standard errors that are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity and 
arbitrary intra-country serial correlation are shown in parentheses. 3. An asterisk denotes significance at the 10% level 
and two asterisks at the 5% level. 4. The instruments used are: agedep, pop, surface. 5. The Sargan test is a test of over-
identifying restrictions. Under the null, the test statistic is distributed as chi-squared in the number of over-identifying 
restrictions (the p-value is reported in parenthesis).  6. The Anderson (1984) canonical correlation is a likelihood-ratio 
test of whether the equation is identified. The Cragg and Donald (1993) test statistic is also a chi-squared test of 
whether the equation is identified. Under the null of underidentification, the statistics are distributed as chi-squared 
with degrees of freedom=(L-K+1) where L=number of instruments (included + excluded) and K is the number of 
regressors (the p-values are reported in parentheses). 7. The 1
st stage F-statistic tests the hypothesis that the 
coefficients on all the excluded instruments are zero in the 1
st stage regression of the endogenous regressor on all 
instruments (the p-value is reported in parenthesis).        22
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govshare*pse  - 0.166 
[0.050]** 
(0.046)** 
- -  -  - 
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 [2.020]**  
(1.768)** 
-3.895 
 [2.061]*  
(1.875)** 
-4.122 




























































2 R   0.291 0.446 0.347  0.335  0.346  0.344 
Notes: 1. The estimation method is OLS. The sample consists of 51 countries, 1985-2000. There are 51 
observations.  2.-3. As in Table 1.     23
APPENDIX: construction of PSE  
 
 
We construct measures of public sector efficiency (PSE) for 64 countries, in four 5-year 
periods, over 1980-2000, as output-to-input ratios by working as in Afonso et al. (2005). 
Afonso et al. have focused on OECD countries, where the available data cover both 
government performance and the associated public expenditure. Although we have tried to 
follow Afonso et al. in the choice of policy areas and variables used, the construction of such 
a rich PSE for a broader group of countries runs into data limitations, especially when 
looking for decomposed public expenditure data. Thus, some deviations from the variables 
used by Afonso et al. are inevitable. Nevertheless, the variables used here are the same in 
spirit. 
  In the policy area of education, the PSP can be measured by the variable Secondary 
School Enrollment, while the associated PEX is the average of the variable Public Spending 
in Education as a percentage of GDP (both variables are available from the World 
Development Indicators, WDI), where we use the end of period values (or the closest to the 
end available) of Secondary School Enrollment.
19 The resulting PSE is then a measure of 
government efficiency in the policy area of education.   
  In the policy area of administration, the PSP is measured by the end of period values 
of the variables Corruption in Government and Bureaucratic Quality (both obtained from 
the IRIS-3 dataset)
20 with higher scores denoting better outcomes, while the PSE is obtained 
as in Afonso et al. (2005) by dividing this variable by the average public spending on goods 
and services (available from WDI).   
In the policy area of infrastructure, the PSP is measured by the average of Diesel 
Locomotives in Use as a percentage of total locomotives, and the average of the inverse of 
Electric Power Transmission and  Distribution Losses (both variables are available from 
WDI). These measures have also been used by Tanzi and Davoodi (1998) as indicators of 
the quality of infrastructure (see also Angelopoulos and Philippopoulos, 2007). A problem 
here is that the relevant PEX for infrastructure quality, which has been used by Afonso et al. 
for the OECD countries, is not available for the larger group of countries we work with. We 
                                                            
19 Afonso et al. (2005) use the same PEX, but they also include a measure of the quality of education when they 
construct the PSP.   
20 Afonso et al. (2005) have used very similar variables (measures of corruption, red tape, quality of judiciary 
and shadow economy). We prefer the IRIS-3 indexes because they are available for the counties and time 
periods we work with.    24
therefore choose to use Total Government Expenditure (as a percentage of GDP) for PEX 
(this is also available from WDI), again averaged over the 5-year period.  
  Finally, in the policy area of stabilization, the PSP is measured by the average of the 
inverse of the variables Inflation Rate and Unemployment Rate (obtained from WDI), while 
the relevant PSE is calculated by dividing this PSP by Total Government Expenditure (as a 
percentage of GDP), averaged over the 5-year period. Afonso et al. also use total 
government spending as a measure of public sector expenditures that are associated with 
stabilization and economic performance indicators, such as inflation and unemployment.   
   25
Table A.1: Public Sector Efficiency (PSE) in 64 countries, 1980-2000 
 




















Algeria   1990-
1995 
0.557 0.793 0.797  0.258  0.466 0.648 0.749  0.242 0.526  -0.065 
Algeria   1995-
2000 
0.586 0.803 0.452  0.233  0.522  0.73 0.459  0.237  0.487 -0.068 
Argentina 1995-
2000 
0.592 1.013 0.528  2.092  1.763 1.366 1.043  4.136 2.077  - 
Australia   1980-
1985 
1.266 1.108 0.972  0.78 2.374 1.048 1.357  1.089 1.467  0.008 
Australia   1985-
1990 
1.309 1.169 1.015  0.552  2.053 1.079 1.296  0.705 1.283  -0.006 
Australia   1990-
1995 
1.224 1.226 0.997  1.316  1.754 1.122 1.243 1.64  1.44  0.006 
Australia   1995-
2000 
1.306 1.222 1.26  1.149  1.954 1.218 1.603  1.462 1.559  0.016 
Austria   1985-
1990 
1.309 1.354 1.214  1.409  1.257 1.074 0.981  1.139 1.113  -0.019 
Austria   1990-
1995 
1.224 1.255 1.043  1.701  1.196 1.083 0.831  1.355 1.116  -0.019 
Austria   1995-
2000 
1.257 1.212 1.247  1.709  1.197 1.042 0.956 1.31  1.127  -0.018 
Belgium   1980-
1985 
1.384 1.254 1.332  1.22 1.181 1.069 0.814  0.745 0.952  -0.032 
Belgium   1985-
1990 
1.285 1.303 1.279  1.108  1.243  1.12 0.791  0.686 0.96  -0.031 
Belgium   1990-
1995 
1.156 1.24 1.155  1.154  1.242 1.114 0.735  0.734 0.956  -0.031 
Bolivia   1985-
1990 
0.359 0.437 0.691  0.23 0.404 0.935 1.584  0.527 0.863  -0.039 
Brazil   1990-
1995 
0.778 0.275 0.42  0.553  1.599  0.78 0.41  0.539  0.832 -0.041 
Bulgaria   1990-
1995 
0.78 1.056  0.724  0.24  0.565 0.934 0.499  0.166 0.541  -0.064 
Bulgaria   1995-
2000 
0.836 1.111 0.618  0.239  0.792 1.606 0.502  0.194 0.773  -0.046 
Canada   1980-
1985 
1.384 1.247 1.107  0.728  2.715 0.921 1.559  1.026 1.555  0.015 
Canada   1985-
1990 
1.429 1.318 1.105  0.686  2.712 0.924 1.432  0.889 1.489  0.010 
Canada   1990-
1995 
1.336 1.284 1.037  1.379  2.457 0.873 1.197  1.592  1.53  0.013 
Canada   1995-
2000 
1.428 1.288 1.187  1.266  3.654  1.13 1.631  1.741  2.039  0.053 
Chile   1985-
1990 
0.715 0.811 0.638  0.374  0.936  1.08 0.783  0.459  0.815 -0.042 
Chile   1990-
1995 
0.668 0.773 0.575  0.756 1.08  1.363 0.856  1.126 1.106  -0.020 
Chile   1995-
2000 
0.952 0.966 0.962  0.748  1.5  1.411 1.377  1.071  1.34  -0.002 
Colombia   1990-
1995 
0.778 0.643 0.302  0.451 2.23  1.09 0.719  1.075  1.278 -0.006 
Costa Rica   1985-
1990 
0.956 0.531 0.917  0.524  0.757 0.568 1.145  0.655 0.781  -0.045 
Costa Rica   1990-
1995 
0.892 0.575 0.698  0.832  0.751 0.743 1.001  1.193 0.922  -0.034   26
Costa Rica   1995-
2000 
0.959 0.563 0.868  0.672  0.892 0.613 1.216  0.941 0.915  -0.035 
Cyprus   1980-
1985 
0.805 1.116 1.248  1.251  0.565 1.481 1.326  1.328 1.175  -0.014 
Cyprus   1985-
1990 
0.832 1.182 1.247  1.306  0.663 1.472 1.289 1.35  1.193  -0.013 
Cyprus   1990-
1995 
1.113 1.204 1.139  1.845  0.897 1.438 1.084  1.757 1.294  -0.005 
Cyprus   1995-
2000 
1.19 1.002  1.491  1.619  0.941 0.977 1.314  1.427 1.165  -0.015 
Czech Rep.  1990-
1995 
0.89 1.228  0.995  1.244  1.043 1.148 0.827  1.033 1.013  -0.027 
Czech Rep.  1995-
2000 
0.952 1.089 1.086  0.777  1.806 1.119 0.954  0.683  1.14  -0.017 
Denmark   1980-
1985 
1.384 1.179 0.952  0.705  1.579 0.829 0.758  0.562 0.932  -0.033 
Denmark   1985-
1990 
1.429 1.291 1.073  0.756  1.755 0.839 0.88 0.62 1.023 -0.026 
Denmark   1990-
1995 
1.336 1.236 1.093  1.791 1.58  0.77 0.837  1.371  1.139 -0.017 
Denmark   1995-
2000 










0.836 0.725 0.32  0.397  1.172 1.783 0.616  0.764 1.084  -0.021 
Egypt   1990-
1995 
0.757 0.919  0.8 0.521 0.61  1.011 0.723  0.471 0.704  -0.051 
Egypt   1995-
2000 
0.592 0.927 0.701  0.563  0.465 0.978 0.677  0.543 0.666  -0.054 
El Salvador   1995-
2000 
0.647 0.515 0.648  0.694  0.539 1.089 1.287  1.378 1.073  -0.022 
Finland   1985-
1990 
1.429 1.383 1.257  0.868  2.288 1.186 1.318  0.911 1.426  0.005 
Finland   1990-
1995 
1.336 1.305 1.248  1.22 1.786 0.909 0.99  0.967  1.163 -0.015 
Finland   1995-
2000 
1.312 1.304 1.773  1.598  1.911 0.905 1.485  1.338  1.41  0.004 
France   1980-
1985 
1.384 1.156 1.163  0.667  1.092 1.067 0.91  0.521  0.898 -0.036 
France   1985-
1990 
1.309 1.275 1.168  0.742  1.108 1.056 0.859  0.545 0.892  -0.036 
France   1990-
1995 
1.112 1.331 1.113  1.477  0.953 1.117 0.782  1.038 0.972  -0.030 
France   1995-
2000 
1.068 1.295 1.289  1.438  0.945 1.075 0.869  0.969 0.965  -0.031 
Germany   1990-
1995 
1.336 1.255 1.592  1.33 1.356 1.272 1.588  1.326 1.386  0.002 
Germany   1995-
2000 
1.306 1.207 1.547  1.467  1.234 1.272 1.445  1.371 1.331  -0.002 
Greece   1980-
1985 
0.739 1.142 0.86  0.559  0.477 2.826 0.77  0.5  1.143 -0.017 
Greece   1985-
1990 
0.98 1.229  0.875  0.41  0.555 2.431 0.64  0.3  0.981 -0.029 
Greece   1990-
1995 
1.002 1.215 0.729  0.555  0.839 2.303 0.626  0.477 1.061  -0.023 
Greece   1995-
2000 
1.074 1.188 1.172  0.577  1.058 1.971 1.144  0.563 1.184  -0.014   27
Hungary   1980-
1985 
0.922 0.987 0.79  1.289  0.861  0.98 0.474  0.773  0.772 -0.046 
Hungary   1985-
1990 
1.049 1.111 0.777  0.342  0.964  0.93 0.438  0.193  0.631 -0.057 
Hungary   1990-
1995 
1.102 1.212 0.766  0.472  0.963 0.905 0.439 0.27  0.644  -0.056 
Hungary   1995-
2000 
1.19 1.166 0.72  0.456  1.545 1.224 0.498  0.315 0.895  -0.036 
Iceland   1985-
1990 
1.429 1.268 0.83  2.745  0.842 1.201 0.862  2.854  1.44  0.006 
Iceland   1990-
1995 
1.336 1.228 0.904  1.258  0.787 1.117 0.858  1.193 0.989  -0.029 
Iceland   1995-
2000 
1.428 1.174 1.228  1.638  0.881 1.003 1.238  1.652 1.193  -0.013 
India   1995-
2000 
0.83 0.534  0.779  0.324  2.335 0.87 1.602  0.667  1.369  0.001 
Indonesia   1985-
1990 
0.154 0.563 0.679  0.536  0.315  3.07 1.051  0.829  1.316 -0.003 
Indonesia   1990-
1995 
0.668 0.597 0.721  0.703  1.487 2.196 1.3  1.268  1.563 0.016 
Iran   1990-
1995 
0.89 1.003  0.621  0.293  0.744 1.038 0.898  0.424 0.776  -0.045 
Ireland   1980-
1985 
1.153 1.151 0.794  0.459  1.281 0.998 0.552  0.319 0.788  -0.045 
Ireland   1985-
1990 
1.191 1.188 0.934  0.632  1.429 0.986 0.656  0.443 0.878  -0.037 
Ireland   1990-
1995 
1.224 1.219 0.803  1.335  1.597  1.11 0.639  1.062  1.102 -0.020 
Ireland   1995-
2000 
1.183 1.058 1.013  1.083  1.878 1.079 0.905  0.968 1.207  -0.012 
Israel   1995-
2000 
1.153 1.163 1.616  0.604  0.702 0.748 1.058  0.395 0.726  -0.049 
Italy   1995-
2000 
1.068 1.214 1.089  0.771  1.269 1.272 0.738  0.522  0.95  -0.032 
Jamaica   1980-
1985 
0.574 0.814 0.551  0.342  0.381 0.646 0.463  0.287 0.444  -0.071 
Jamaica   1985-
1990 
0.594 0.945 0.408  0.24 0.282 0.851 0.334  0.196 0.416  -0.074 
Jamaica   1990-
1995 
0.778 0.9  0.4  0.265  0.593  0.974 0.587  0.389 0.636  -0.056 
Jamaica   1995-
2000 
0.83 1.085  0.819  0.309  0.451 0.905 0.721  0.272 0.587  -0.060 
Japan   1980-
1985 
1.266 1.349 1.479  1.993  5.247 1.232 2.676  3.606  3.19  0.143 
Japan   1985-
1990 
1.309 1.439 1.475  2.489  5.594 1.352 2.816  4.753 3.629  0.177 
Japan   1990-
1995 
1.224 1.39 1.371  2.784  5.47 1.816 2.128  4.322 3.434  0.162 
Jordan   1985-
1990 
0.715 0.488 0.627  0.523  0.346  0.46 0.56  0.467  0.458 -0.070 
Jordan   1990-
1995 
0.89 0.584 0.85  0.859  0.455 0.368 0.807  0.816 0.611  -0.058 
Jordan   1995-
2000 
0.952 0.818 0.992  0.682  0.465 0.551 0.956  0.657 0.658  -0.055 
Korea, Rep  1980-
1985 
0.687 1.191 1.193  0.811 0.89  1.54 2.266  1.539  1.559  0.016 
Korea, Rep  1985-
1990 
0.711 1.275 1.263  1.152  1.131 1.542 2.542  2.319 1.883  0.041   28
Korea, Rep  1990-
1995 
1.113 1.353 1.176  1.645 1.96  1.653 2.225  3.112 2.237  0.069 
Korea, Rep  1995-
2000 
1.068 1.333 1.512  1.165  2.254 1.757 2.753  2.121 2.221  0.067 
Lebanon   1995-
2000 
0.354 1.039 0.548  0.771  0.311 2.071 0.46  0.648  0.872 -0.038 
Luxembourg   1980-
1985 
1.372 0.936 1.136  1.704  1.418  0.8 0.867  1.3 1.096 -0.020 
Luxembourg   1985-
1990 
1.429 0.953 1.044  2.003  1.585 0.958 0.871  1.671 1.271  -0.007 
Luxembourg   1990-
1995 
1.336 0.944 0.418  2.34 1.426 1.396 0.331 1.85  1.251  -0.008 
Luxembourg   1995-
2000 
1.342 0.929 0.299  2.274  1.441  1.12 0.238  1.81 1.152 -0.016 
Malaysia   1995-
2000 
0.952 1.277 0.933  1.559  1.012 1.357 1.378  2.301 1.512  0.012 
Mexico   1980-
1985 
0.624 0.649 0.755  0.165  1.003 0.741 1.165  0.254 0.791  -0.044 
Mexico   1985-
1990 
0.715 0.666 0.731  0.94 1.325 0.888 0.91 1.17 1.074 -0.022 
Mexico   1990-
1995 
0.668 0.722 0.725  1.077  1.319 0.811 1.467 2.18  1.444  0.007 
Mexico   1995-
2000 
0.592 0.771 0.726  0.964 1.51  0.764 1.455  1.931 1.415  0.004 
Namibia   1990-
1995 
1.113 0.504 1.128  0.403  0.417 0.269 0.991  0.354 0.508  -0.066 
Namibia   1995-
2000 
1.068 0.432 1.115  0.343  0.425 0.254 0.959  0.295 0.483  -0.068 
Netherlands   1980-
1985 
1.384 1.254 1.501  1.114 1.65  0.907 0.912  0.677 1.037  -0.025 
Netherlands   1985-
1990 
1.429 1.243 1.47  2.888  1.762 0.901 0.873  1.714 1.313  -0.004 
Netherlands   1990-
1995 
1.336 1.279 1.291  1.528  1.744 1.115 0.799  0.945  1.15  -0.016 
Netherlands   1995-
2000 
1.428 1.273 1.561  1.312  1.947 1.271 1.037  0.871 1.281  -0.006 
New Zealand   1980-
1985 
1.384 1.185 0.86  0.744  1.235 1.165 0.7  0.605  0.926 -0.034 
New Zealand   1985-
1990 
1.429 1.264 0.924  0.599  1.269 1.042 0.684  0.443  0.86  -0.039 
New Zealand   1990-
1995 
1.336 1.256 0.875  1.583  0.893 0.885 0.704  1.273 0.939  -0.033 
New Zealand   1995-
2000 
1.306 1.241 0.71  1.355  0.784 0.872 0.677  1.293 0.907  -0.035 
Nicaragua   1995-
2000 
0.721 0.449 0.315  0.355  0.588 0.626 0.271  0.305 0.447  -0.071 
Norway   1980-
1985 
1.293 1.217 0.978  1.207  1.716 0.993 0.92  1.135  1.191 -0.013 
Norway   1985-
1990 
1.312 1.304 1.017  1.06 1.763 0.916 0.853  0.889 1.105  -0.020 
Norway   1990-
1995 
1.336 1.346 0.998  1.649  1.537 0.833 0.738  1.221 1.082  -0.022 
Norway   1995-
2000 
1.306 1.325 1.129  1.488  1.698 0.849 0.949  1.251 1.187  -0.013 
Panama   1980-
1985 
0.348 0.677 0.525  1.003  0.205 0.787 0.541  1.034 0.642  -0.056 
Panama   1985-
1990 
0.359 0.754 0.363  3.949  0.209 0.712 0.419  4.555 1.474  0.009   29
Paraguay 1985-
1990 
0.117 0.384 3.504  0.489  0.228 1.539 12.52  1.747 4.008  - 
Paraguay 1990-
1995 
0.556 0.503 10.84  0.698  0.822 1.043 28.17  1.812  7.96  - 
Peru   1980-
1985 
0.579 0.693 0.717  0.11 0.633 1.202 1.252  0.192  0.82  -0.042 
Peru   1990-
1995 
0.557 0.749 0.356  0.356 0.97  1.137 0.603  0.603 0.828  -0.041 
Peru   1995-
2000 
0.598 0.845 0.587  0.606 0.84  1.317 0.993  1.025 1.044  -0.025 
Philippines   1980-
1985 
0.192 0.701 1.417  0.604  0.259 1.952 3.714  1.583 1.877  0.040 
Philippines   1985-
1990 
0.359 0.842 0.449  0.485  0.467 1.768 0.946  1.021  1.05  -0.024 
Philippines   1990-
1995 
0.557 0.829 0.449  0.622  0.649 1.459 0.733  1.015 0.964  -0.031 
Poland   1990-
1995 
1.058 1.191 0.731  0.271 0.93  1.127 0.547  0.203 0.702  -0.051 
Portugal   1985-
1990 
0.98 1.038 0.84  0.472  0.825 1.246 0.709  0.398 0.794  -0.044 
Portugal   1990-
1995 
0.946 1.095 0.849  0.926  0.577 1.058 0.643  0.701 0.744  -0.048 
Portugal   1995-
2000 
1.074 1.205 1.015  1.033  0.661 1.094 0.797  0.811 0.841  -0.040 
Romania   1990-
1995 
0.669 1.029 0.736  0.419 0.58  1.495 0.663  0.377 0.779  -0.045 
Romania   1995-
2000 
0.598 1.038 0.845  0.512  0.546 1.282 0.805  0.487  0.78  -0.045 
South Africa   1985-
1990 
1.309 0.751 1.302  0.234  0.805 0.626 1.361  0.244 0.759  -0.047 
South Africa   1990-
1995 
1.069 0.812 1.02  0.403  0.673 0.615 1.015  0.401 0.676  -0.053 
South Africa   1995-
2000 
1.074 0.768 1.17  0.352  1.381 0.605 1.186  0.357 0.882  -0.037 
Spain   1995-
2000 
1.19 1.259 1.02  0.667  2.132 1.337 0.929  0.607 1.251  -0.008 
Sweden   1985-
1990 
1.429 1.267 1.105  1.299  2.461 0.824 0.863  1.015 1.291  -0.005 
Sweden   1990-
1995 
1.336 1.388 0.99  1.031  1.979 0.869 0.694  0.723 1.066  -0.023 
Sweden   1995-
2000 
1.428 1.368 1.234  2.248  2.129 0.877 0.894  1.628 1.382  0.002 
Switzerland   1980-
1985 
1.384 1.119 1.239  4.532  2.379 1.128 2.089  7.642  3.31  0.152 
Switzerland   1990-
1995 
1.336 1.178 1.099  1.95 1.672 1.009 1.346  2.389 1.604  0.019 
Switzerland   1995-
2000 
1.306 1.142 1.41  2.735  1.575 1.006 1.59  3.083  1.813  0.035 
Syria   1980-
1985 
0.461 0.72 0.767  0.8 0.224 0.642 0.577  0.602 0.511  -0.066 
Thailand   1995-
2000 










0.714 0.996 0.984  0.557  0.488  1.51 1.089  0.616  0.926 -0.034 
Tunisia   1985-
1990 
0.715 0.632 0.647  0.502  0.567 0.498 0.567  0.441 0.518  -0.066   30
Tunisia   1995-
2000 
0.714 0.754 0.863  0.739  0.551 0.536 0.836  0.716  0.66  -0.055 
Turkey   1980-
1985 
0.692 0.51 0.728  0.258  0.798 1.076 1.169  0.413 0.864  -0.039 
Turkey   1985-
1990 
0.594 0.615 0.731  0.28 0.877 1.895 1.327  0.509 1.152  -0.016 
Turkey   1990-
1995 
0.846 0.723 0.728  0.419  0.772 1.201 1.058  0.609  0.91  -0.035 
Turkey   1995-
2000 




















1.232 1.288 1.048  0.975 1.09  1.278 0.844  0.785 0.999  -0.028 
Uruguay   1995-
2000 
0.83 0.901  0.472  0.382  0.89 1.662 0.484  0.392 0.857  0.001 
USA   1980-
1985 
1.266 1.291 1.044  0.851  1.778 1.001 1.494  1.218 1.373  0.006 
USA   1985-
1990 
1.309 1.275 1.161  0.878  1.821 1.093 1.612  1.219 1.436  0.014 
USA   1990-
1995 
1.224 1.268 0.962  1.287  1.955 1.154 1.307  1.748 1.541  0.045 
USA   1995-
2000 
1.183 1.24 1.288  1.282  2.637 1.218 1.954  1.944 1.938  -0.039 
Venezuela   1980-
1985 
0.692 0.224 0.617  0.585  0.684 0.213 0.92  0.872  0.672 -0.054 
Venezuela   1985-
1990 
0.715 0.276 0.462  0.283  0.996 0.265 0.72 0.44 0.606 -0.059 
Venezuela   1990-
1995 
0.668 0.271 0.341  0.424  1.042 0.287 0.539  0.669 0.634  -0.057 
Venezuela   1995-
2000 
0.714 0.307 0.603  0.305  1.534 0.302 0.978  0.494 0.827  -0.041 
Yemen   1995-
2000 
0.714 0.484 0.332  0.115  0.479 0.446 0.351  0.122  0.35  -0.079 
 
Key: 
PSP: Public Sector Performance 





* See footnote 6 
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Table A.2: Technical Efficiency (TE) of public spending in 52 countries, 1995-2000  
 
 
Country   TE 
Growth
 effect  Country   TE 
Growth 
 effect 
Algeria   0.363355 -0.133  New Zealand   0.7823  -0.027 
Argentina (see fn 6)   0.830471 -  Nicaragua   0.312448  -0.146 
Australia   0.875214 -0.004 Norway   0.858392  -0.008 
Austria   0.867984 -0.005 Peru   0.509566  -0.096 
Bulgaria   0.466058 -0.107 Portugal   0.706914  -0.046 
Canada   0.910333 0.005 Romania   0.513156  -0.095 
Chile   0.672651 -0.055 South Africa   0.582557  -0.078 
Costa Rica   0.56748  -0.081 Spain   0.697047  -0.049 
Cyprus   0.872052 -0.004 Sweden   0.934942  0.012 
Czech Republic   0.653997 -0.060 Switzerland   0.965281  0.019 
Denmark   0.885186 -0.001 Thailand   0.857647  -0.008 
Dominican Rep.  0.453656 -0.110 Trinidad & Tobago 0.573398  -0.080 
Egypt   0.47918  -0.104 Tunisia   0.527729  -0.091 
El Salvador   0.500757 -0.098 Turkey   0.461675  -0.108 
Finland   0.928959 0.010 United Kingdom   0.745181  -0.036 
France   0.802157 -0.022 Uruguay   0.451386  0.004 
Germany   0.903573 0.004 USA   0.903279  -0.111 
Greece   0.686213 -0.051 Venezuela   0.372336  -0.131 
Hungary   0.565051 -0.082 Yemen   0.292314  -0.151 
Iceland   0.906244 0.004     
India   0.496827 -0.099     
Ireland   0.727425 -0.041     
Israel   0.713245 -0.045     
Italy   0.657281 -0.059     
Jamaica   0.513118 -0.095     
Jordan   0.589832 -0.076     
Korea, Rep  0.927815 0.010     
Lebanon   0.454145 -0.110     
Luxembourg   0.791004 -0.025     
Malaysia   0.866256 -0.006     
Mexico   0.608441 -0.071     
Namibia   0.496673 -0.099     
Netherlands   0.866055 -0.006
    
 
   32
References  
 
Afonso A., L. Schuknecht and V. Tanzi (2005): Public sector efficiency: An international 
comparison, Public Choice, 123, 321-347. 
 
Afonso A., L. Schuknecht and V. Tanzi (2006): Public sector efficiency: Evidence for new EU 
member states and emerging markets, ECB Working Paper, no. 581. 
 
Agell J., H. Ohlsson and P. S. Thoursie (2006): Growth effects of government expenditure and 
taxation in rich countries: A comment, European Economic Review, 50, 211-218. 
 
Anderson T.W. (1984): Introduction to Multivariate Statistical Analysis, 2d edition, New York: 
John Wiley & Sons. 
 
Angelopoulos K., G. Economides and P. Kammas (2007): Tax-spending policies and economic 
growth: Theoretical predictions and evidence from the OECD, European Journal of Political 
Economy, 23, 885-902.  
 
Angelopoulos K. and A. Philippopoulos (2007): The growth effects of fiscal policy in Greece 1960-
2000, Public Choice, 131, 157-175. 
 
Baum C. F., M. E. Schaffer and S. Stillman (2006):  Stata module to Extended instrumental 
variables/2SLS, GMM and AC/HAC, LIML and k-class regression,   
http://ideas.repec.org/c/boc/bocode/s425401.html 
 
Barro R. (1990): Government spending in a simple model of economic growth, Journal of Political 
Economy, 98, S103-S125.  
 
Barro R. and X. Sala-i-Martin (2004): Economic Growth, Second edition, The MIT Press, Cambridge, 
Mass.  
 
Cragg J.G. and S.G. Donald (1993): Testing identfiability and specification in instrumental 
variables models, Econometric Theory, 9, 222-240. 
 
De Haan J., S. Lundstrom and J.-E. Sturm (2006): Market-oriented institutions and policies and 
economic growth: a critical survey, Journal of Economic Surveys, 20, 157-191.  
 
Devarajan S., Swaroop, V., Zoo H. (1996): The composition of public expenditure and economic 
growth, Journal of Monetary Economics, 37, 313-344. 
 
Dutt P. and D. Mitra (2002): Endogenous trade policy through majority voting: An empirical 
investigation, Journal of International Economics, 58, 107-133. 
 
Folster S. and M. Henrekson (2001): Growth effects of government expenditure and taxation in rich 
countries, European Economic Review, 45, 1501-20. 
 
Gemmel N. and R. Kneller (2001): The impact of fiscal policy on long-run growth, European 
Economy, 1, 98-129. 
 
Greene W. H. (2005): Efficiency of public spending in developing countries: A stochastic frontier 
approach, May 2005, mimeo.   33
Gwartney J., R. Holcombe and R. Lawson (1998): The scope of government and the wealth of 
nations, Cato Journal, 18, 163-190.  
 
Heston A., R. Summers and B. Aten (2002): Penn World Table Version 6.1, Center for 
International Comparisons at the University of Pennsylvania (CICUP). 
 
Hillman A. (2003): Public Finance and Public Policy: Responsibilities and Limitations of 
Government, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
 
Kneller R., M. Bleaney and N. Gemmel (1999): Public policy and the government budget 
constraint, Journal of Public Economics, 74, 171-190. 
 
Kumbhakar S. C. and C. A. K. Lovell (2000): Stochastic Frontier Analysis, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge 
 
Levine R. and D. Renelt (1992): A sensitivity analysis of cross-country growth regressions, 
American Economic Review, 82, 942-63.  
 
Miller S. and F. Russek (1997): Fiscal structures and economic growth: international evidence, 
Economic Inquiry, XXXV, 603-613.  
 
Mueller D. (2003): Public Choice III, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
 
Persson T. and G. Tabellini (2003): The Economic Effects of Constitutions. The MIT Press, 
Cambridge, Mass.   
 
Tanzi V. and H. R. Davoodi (1998): Corruption, public investment and growth, in The Welfare 
State, Public Investment and Growth, edited by H. Shibata and T. Ihori, Springer-Verlag, Tokyo.  
 
Tanzi V. and L. Schuknecht (2000): Public Spending in the 20th Century: A Global Perspective, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
 
Tanzi V. and H. Zee (1997): Fiscal policy and long-run growth, IMF Staff Papers, 44, 179-209. 
 
Wooldridge J. W. (2002): Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data, The MIT Press, 
Cambridge, Mass. 
 
 
 